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Copper chloride cycle is a proven efficient method to separate hydrogen from water. Super Critical Water Reactor 
(SCWR) is the focus of generation IV reactor design for optimization of the nuclear energy. This research has modeled an 
integration of copper chloride cycle hydrogen and oxygen units with the proposed SCWR Primary Heat Transport (PHT) 
cycle, to accommodate the load variation and to compensate SCWR excessive heat produced during off peak hours. Copper 
chloride cycle is regenerative and can meet up to fifty percent of its heat requirements; the research investigates the 
efficiency and safety of a switch over between self-generated and external heat mechanism. The integration is analyzed for 
its reliability by using the conventional fault tree method and state of the art dynamic flowgraph methodology. Dynamic 
flowgraph methodology dymonda software analysis produced probable alternates, depicting the probabilistic risk 
assessment for the integration model.  
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Current Super Critical Water Reactor (SCWR) research and development focuses on two different 
technologies. The pressure tube CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor design and the US pressure 
vessel Light Water Reactor (LWR) reactor design. The research model assumes CANDU-SCWR technology, 
bearing main features of higher thermal efficiency (45 to 50%) and simplified system configuration, which is 
due to one phase superheated steam cycle that contributes to lowe   r cost by elimination of certain equipments 
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and thereby cheaper electricity. The technology primary heat transport system uses light water that operates at a 
temperature and pressure higher than 600oC and 22.1MPa [1-3].  
Super critical water fossil fuel power plants have been operating for a long time [4] and the operating 
experience and design features can be adapted in the CANDU-SCWR nuclear reactors. CANDU operational 
knowledge forms the basis of generation III and generation IV advance technologies including the Advanced 
CANDU Reactor (ACR) and the SCWR.  
In recent years significant efforts are currently underway to develop the hydrogen co-generation model 
by CANDU-SCWR associated enabling technologies. The CANDU-SCWR heat and steam is planned to be 
used for hydrogen production by copper chloride method which is increasingly viewed as a strong component 
of zero emission energy technology. The SCWR is still in its evolution phase; therefore, collaborative efforts 
are required to better understand SCWR plant materials, chemistry, safety, reliability and stability methods. 
This paper is organized into eight sections including introduction. Section two gives an overview of 
the copper chlorine cycle, section three discusses the load variation statistics, section four investigates fault tree 
and distinguishes the systems for the fault tree. Section five determines the levels of failure in the fault tree 
organized for the co-generation model. DFM cogeneration model probabilistic risk assessment is defined in 
section six. Discussion for the safety analysis was carried out in section seven. The conclusion is carried out in 
section eight.       
2. Copper Chloride Cycle: 
Various electrochemical processes [5] for hydrogen production are identified and currently under 
review but very few have been found feasible. The methods and cycles which are proven viable for hydrogen 
production contain Steam Methane Reforming (SMR), Sulphur-Iodine (S-I) and Copper Chloride (Cu-Cl) 
cycles. The SMR cycle operates at higher temperatures from 700 to 800 C and it is not free from carbon 
emission, whereas copper chloride hydrogen cycle operates at lower temperature i.e. 550 C, and is also free 
from carbon emission.  Hydrogen production using a combination of electro-chemical processes can maintain 
the nuclear plant efficiency by utilizing its load variation excessive heat and is also a source of clean energy 
hydrogen fuel.   
 
2Cu(s) + 2HCl                       CuCl (l) + H2 (g)      (1) 
2Cu(s) + 2Cucl (Aq)              CuCl2 (Aq) + Cu(s)      (2) 
CuCl2(Aq)                              CuCl2 (s)       (3) 
2CuCl2(s) + H2O(g)               CuOCuCl2(s) + 2HCl(g)     (4) 
CuOCuCl2(s)                          2CuCl (l) + ½ O2 (g)      (5) 
 
The above equations show the five step copper chloride chemical reactions in gaseous, solid and 
aqueous states. The reactions requiring higher temperatures are decomposition of cupric oxide copper chloride 
into oxygen gas, and hydrogen gas production (equation one and five), with temperature ranges from 430 to 
530 C. The SCWR heat is expanded in these two loops. CANDU-SCWR heat is passed through local heat 
exchangers of oxygen and hydrogen units, and the heat coming out from outlet of these heat exchangers can be 
further utilized within the closed loop cycle for chemical reactions requiring lower heat, thereby forming a 
regenerative loop which can meet up to 40-50% of copper chloride cycle heat requirement. CANDU-SCWR 
Hydrogen cogeneration cycle is comprised of: a super critical reactor, a supercritical turbine, which consists of 
one High-Pressure (HP) cylinder, and multiple Low-Pressure (LP) cylinders, one de-aerator, seven feed water 
heaters, and pumps. 
Fault tree is a conventional risk assessment method used as initial assessment for the copper chloride 
CANDU-SCWR integration model. Dynamic flowgraph methodology is more flexible and predictive using 
multiple parameters input as compared to fault tree which can accommodate only two inputs. The research used 
dymonda software [6] which generated promising results that helped to analyze parameter variations and 
possible outcomes to devise probabilistic risk assessment for the proposed model.  
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3. Load Variation: 
Nuclear energy meets about thirty percent of Ontario province energy need, with an average demand 
of 15000 MWe and average production of 22000 MWe. Keeping in view of current trend of SCWR design 
efforts, and assuming that nuclear sector would accommodate new CANDU SCWR reactors in place of 
conventional heavy water CANDU reactors; the research has developed its cogeneration model. Study of 
Ontario region electrical production reveals a variation between the supply and demand of the power generated. 
The statistical investigation shows that there is an excessive 7000 MWe capacity due to load variation which is 
not utilized and the heat generated in nuclear and conventional power plants is wasted. The 7000 MWe is about 
20 per cent of the total production, and following the contribution trend of nuclear plants, 7 per cent of this 
excess energy comes from nuclear power plants. The Co-generation hydrogen production unit can efficiently 
utilize this excessive power to produce carbon free, clean energy hydrogen fuel. The research has analyzed the 
major variations between specific times when excessive steam is available during off peak hours for CANDU 
SCWR Hydrogen production. The research analysis shows that a minimum energy requirement is between 1 am 
to 5 am, with an exponential growth in demand between 6 am to 9 am, which is further maximized between 4 
pm to 8 pm. Weekends also have extra heat available due to lower loads. According to this time based load and 
demand variation analysis, the extraction time for heat can be synchronized with the hydrogen production unit 
for better and efficient co-generation mechanism.  
Load variation is a major cause of concern for both operation and safety standards of current CANDU 
reactors. In order to cope with the reactor excessive steam generated during sudden load variation, the current 
CANDU systems utilize steam rejection to condenser and atmosphere; moreover, sudden load variations can 
also be controlled by the reactivity controls. Both of these are system overhead that can be minimized through 




















          Fig. 1. MW Available for Hydrogen Production during peak and off peak Hours  
The research has plotted the values for the energy generated  by power generation units in percent of 
peak demand hour on y-axis and excess megawatt electrical and thermal available due to load variation for 
hydrogen production on x-axis; to better accommodate the variations, these values are taken as log based, 
showing the plot in Fig. 1. The simulation has assumed CANDU SCWR as part of the power generation units in 
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Ontario province, contributing 10% of the power generation. The research has taken the reference standard as 
the peak demand hour from 6 pm to 8pm, represented as 100 on the y-axis, a high demand hour between 9 am 
to 4 pm which is represented as 92 on y-axis, and minimal demand hour between 1 am to 5 am as 66 on y-axis. 
The corresponding mega watts of electrical power, available for hydrogen production are plotted at x-axis. The 
maximum heat available for hydrogen production is at minimal demand hour that is between 1am to 5am and 
the minimum heat available for hydrogen production is between 6pm to 8pm, which is the maximum demand 
period. 
4. Fault Tree: 
The fault tree is a well known safety analysis method that defines system failure and develops a 
relation between cause and effect. The research fault tree analyzes all the major components of co-generation 
model. The components assumed in fault tree are major components of SCWR CANDU Hydrogen co-
generation model’s condenser, Low Pressure (LP) heaters, High Pressure (HP) heaters, de-aerator, reactor and 
hydrogen production unit. 
In the proposed CANDU SCWR Hydrogen co-generation model, all the systems are parameterized 
and any variation in secondary or primary heat transport would lead to the failure of the heat cycle and results 
in plant shutdown.    
The major failure modes considered are: 
 
S. No. Modes of Failure 
1. Improper condensate supply to LP heaters 
2. Improper condensate supply to De-aerator 
3. Improper steam supply to HP heaters 
4. Super heated steam loop failure 
5. Loop1 high temperature, high pressure failure 
6. Loop2 high temperature, low pressure failure 
7. Oxygen reactor unit failure 
8. Hydrogen unit failure 
     
                            Table 1. Modes of failure considered for fault tree analysis 
5. Fault Tree Levels: 
Fault tree generates a picture of possible failure states and corresponding related steps that can fail the 
system. The system failure probability is also helpful to model the risk analysis. The research has analyzed 
eight levels of failures, whereas level 7 presents multiple failure possibilities that can minimize or stop the 
steam supply to the LP heaters bank. 
Level 1: The make-up valve maintains the minimum condensate level within condenser through the 
condensate storage tank, and its failure can generate a low level condensate condition in the condenser. As all 
the steps are interconnected therefore any abnormal condition can affect later stages of the loop. Condenser 
supply pump failure can choke the feed water supply to LP heaters. Steam extraction valve from LP turbine to 
condenser is crucial for the feed water supply. Condenser return or reject valve is for checking extra supply 
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Fig. 2 Eight Stage Safety Fault Tree for CANDU SCWR Hydrogen Co-Generation Model  
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storage tank. Combination of all or anyone of the failure can result in improper condensate supply to LP 
heaters.   
Level 2: The steam flow, and pressure and temperature to LP heaters bank is controlled through digital 
logic controller. Digital logic controllers are integral part of control network. Steam extraction valves from LP 
turbine provide a reliable steam path for the LP heaters that not only maintain the steam cycle but it also 
maintain the loop required temperature level. These two failures combined with the previous stages cascaded 
failures can cause an improper steam supply to the de-aerators.  
Level 3: The steam from de-aerator is pumped through boiler feed water pump that maintains both 
steam temperature and pressure. Steam from HP turbine bleed supply can be interrupted by extraction valve 
failure, which is essential to maintain the required temperature at HP heaters bank. Extraction valve failure, the 
BFW pump failure and HP heaters intake valves failure can result in improper supply of steam to HP heaters. 
  Level 4: The steam from HP heaters is high temperature steam that serves as input to SCWR Reactor. 
The control valves and motorized intake valve is the connection between HP heaters and the SCWR reactor 
steam generator and their failure can result in a reactor trip. The model is also utilizing regenerative loop steam 
from the main steam generator of SCWR, and reactor trip would also cease the steam from the regenerative 
loop.  
Level 5: The reactor trip results in failure of steam supply to hydrogen production unit from main loop 
and also from the regenerative loop. 
Level 6: The reactor trip would cause both the loop 1 and loop 2 failures. Loop 1 is high temperature 
and pressure and loop 2 is high temperature low pressure loop.  
Level 7: Super heated flow rate failure from both loop1 and loop2 is the result of reactor trip. 
Level 8: Level 5, 6 and 7 failures would cause an insufficient heat supply to hydrogen production unit 
oxygen reactor and results in oxygen reactor unit failure. It also defines copper chloride hydrogen reactor units 
failure which contributes to hydrogen production failure.  
Emergency restart procedures were followed during eighties for a reactor trip by CANDU operators 
but this method has been declared unsafe and terminated. The research assumes the same criteria with no 
emergency restart to produce heat for the hydrogen production unit.  
6. Probablistic Risk Analysis (PRA): 
The probabilistic analysis is a quantitative analysis of risk factor in mission critical systems such as 
aerospace, chemical and nuclear industry. There have been extensive preventive analyses conducted by US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to analyze data and prevent any probability of accident. The fault tree 
handbook [7] and PRA procedures guide by NRC are such example to standardize risk assessment 
methodologies. Modern digital control systems analysis can be complex as system reliability analysis involves 
both software and hardware errors. The research has found no evidence of adaptation of Dynamic Flow Graph 
(DFM) methodology by NRC for their safety publications.  
PRA system modeling for large and complex system such as Copper Chloride CANDU SCWR 
Hydrogen cogeneration model has been inspired by the conventional nuclear power plants PRAs, advocating 
the use of a reliable system modeling tool to eliminate the uncertainties of numerical results of conventional 
PRA methodologies. The history of nuclear accidents has revealed that initiators of large system failure are very 
rare [8], and unreliable due to the validity of the data for failure estimation [9-10]. The Dynamic Flow Graph 
methodology model (DFM) [11-13] refines the PRA by evaluating the data obtained through physical 
observation and numerical analysis and extrapolations.  
a. Dynamic Flow graph Methodology (DFM) Modeling: 
A DFM model is cause and effect analysis of a system object with all the possible combinations in the 
form of a directed graph. Fault tree models are based on binary input and could not satisfy the entire system 
783 Fayyaz Ahmed /  Procedia Computer Science  19 ( 2013 )  777 – 785 
 
state that comprises multiple timed variables and multiple binary logical conditions. The DFM modelling 
employs Multiple Value Logic (MVL), which can represent the entire system and can generate a probabilistic 
risk assessment method for all system failure states. The model integrates the hardware and software together 
with conditional operators such as AND, OR, XOR etc. The components of DFM are discrete or continuous 
variables, conditional branches, transition sequences merging various discrete values to produce top events in 
the form of prime implicants. The top event shows the state that can be critical for a particular system. The 
DFM method can analyse a system through deductive and inductive algorithms [14]. The deductive procedure 
is developed on a particular top event, normally taken as a failure state. This analysis is often termed as 
backward analysis from effects to causes. The backward analysis finds the set of variables through nodes, 
edges, transfer and transition boxes that generate the top event. The output of deductive analysis is a set of 
prime implicants. The deductive analysis is analogous to a fault tree analysis.  
The inductive algorithm is often called the forward cause and effect analysis. For a particular set of 
inputs, the outputs can be normal outputs or may contain errors. The desired states can verify the system 
requirements whereas the undesired states can verify the system safety behaviour.  
b. CANDU SCWR Hydrogen DFM Model: 
The research has designed CANDU SCWR Hydrogen co-generation DFM model [15] that simulates 
the loops described in fault tree in the previous section. The research has analysed the main components of the 
co-generation loop. The analysis parameters are flow, level and power. The main architecture consists of 
sensors, controllers and actuators. Research has also defined various conditions for pumps, valves, level 
controllers and actuators that generate a set of prime implicants. 


















Referring to Fig. 3a. and 3b., process variable nodes [16] represent the physical variables and 
corresponding control system states. Digital control system processes can be represented by software or 
hardware node. The node can be discrete or continuous with multiple states that can be generated according to 




Fig. 3a. and 3b. DFM Safety Analysis for CANDU SCWR Hydrogen Co-Generation Model  
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The cause and effect relationship between different variables within the DFM model is defined 
through causality edges. The edges functional relationship is developed by connecting to a transition box, or to 
a transfer box with the process variable nodes.  
The transfer box can represent the outcome of two or more process variables. The system knowledge 
can generate a logical relation between the anticipated outputs. The possible combinations that can truly reflect 
the system behaviour can develop the decision table. The table is based on logical operators and the number of 
inputs associated with it. The Pseudo code forms a logical link between various possible system states and 
predicts system behaviour in normal and abnormal conditions. The decision table entries are crucial for the 
system model, as improper selection can result in erroneous outcomes. A judicial combination results in stable 
system model.  
Condition nodes are used to represent the control logic mapping input variable to output variable 
states. The conditional connection sets possible logical conditions for the associated transfer box. The set of 
inputs together with specific conditions associated with the transfer box can produce specific outputs. The 
nodes represent the physical or software parameters. The conditions can be failure of component, process 
changes or software switching mode; that are discrete variable with finite possible outputs. 
Fig. 3 a. and b. show the snapshots of the model, showing the components of the model. The prime 
implicants generated through the deductive analysis for BFW pump failure; hydrogen reactor failure and 
SCWR loop high temperature failure. The discrete node of BFW pump that has two, failed and working 
conditions associated with the node; condensate condition discrete node with AND, OR switch conditions; 
continuous node of control valve 1 with low, high and normal conditions. Transfer box with multiple 
combination of four different condition rows in a decision table. 
Fig. 4 shows the CANDU-SCWR hydrogen co-generation feed water control loop that is the main 
source of regenerative heat for the hydrogen production unit. The prime implicants generated through deductive 















The model assumes taking heat from the regenerative low pressure and high temperature loop of the 
CANDU SCWR reactor for oxygen and hydrogen reactor of the hydrogen production unit. The low pressure 
loop pressure and temperature are maintained by pumps at hydrogen unit intake. The hydrogen production unit 
uses the excessive heat from the reactor during off peak hours; and only for the oxygen and hydrogen reactor. 
The secondary loops of hydrogen units, such as electrolytic unit and fluidized bed can utilize the regenerative 
heat coming out of oxygen and hydrogen reactor heat exchangers. The research focus is the utilization of the 
excessive heat of CANDU SCWR during off peak hours for hydrogen production and since this excess is 
system overhead therefore cogeneration unit not only eliminates the use of reactivity control or steam rejection 
mechanism but also economize the hydrogen production. It is worth to state that hydrogen production unit 
 
Fig. 4 Feed Water Control Loop Safety Analyses for CANDU SCWR Hydrogen Co-Generation Model  
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would require primary heat production for continuous operation and generation of hydrogen, while heat from 
CANDU SCWR would serve as secondary source.            
The research analyzed the fault and DFM methodologies for the possible failure scenarios for the co-
generation model. Only feed water, heat transport and oxygen and hydrogen reactor cycles were taken into 
account. Associated system such as water treatment plant, electrical and mechanical system failure was not 
discussed due to scarcity of space.      
8. Conclusion: 
The research statistical investigation revealed that there is an abundance of heat available due to load 
variations in Ontario province that can be utilized for the CANDU SCWR hydrogen co-generation model. It 
was also explored that for similar system parameters, fault tree can analyze only basic parameters, without any 
associated conditions related to that particular system while DFM method can develop a set of a combination of 
binary conditions for AND, OR, XOR and NAND logics in the form of transfer boxes. The proposed copper 
chlorine CANDU SCWR hydrogen model minimizes system overhead due to load variation which required 
steam reject and reactivity control mechanisms. The analysis concludes that DFM method can simulate real 
time conditions for a system and is more reliable for probabilistic risk assessment.  
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